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Abstract
This article aims at clarifying the language and practice of scientific
experiment, mainly by hooking observability on calculability.
1 Motivation
Scientific knowledge is traditionally based on logic and experiment. However,
I will defend that experiment involves a lot of logic, if not only logic.
As an experimentalist, I have found out, which is not easy to admit, that
experiments do fail logically as well as technically. “Experiment, observable,
error, interpretation, constant. . . ” are ill-defined. Every experimental con-
stant hides a potential variable. Technology and jargon are often hopeless
attempts to escape a logical quagmire. The very difficulty of discussing ex-
periment indicates a need of logic, where it has been too quickly eliminated,
to explain and prevent failures, and eventually to sharpen our understanding
of nature, including ourselves.
“Analog computing, numerical experiment, thought experiment, experi-
mental program, object programming, computing hardware, natural or real
number” implicitly relate computing and experiment. Could the art of ex-
periment develop somehow like the art of computer programming, at least for
the sake of their cooperation? I will defend that experiment is computing,
by hooking observability on calculability, a well-established mathematical
concept [1].
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A theory of experiment should describe: - objects, with just as much detail
as needed, symbolically, - relations, between a user and objects, - interactions,
between objects, - the user’s action, to extract information from objects. A
duplicity of relation and action is a feature of both experiment and functional
programming. Both symbolism and functional programming are supported
by Mathematica [2, 3].
2 Formal system
2.1 Calculability
The user expresses y in a natural lexicon by x in a formal lexicon, y ⊲x, x⊳y.
The formal expresses the natural: time⊲t, let t be time, for time t. An object
is nothing but what the user expresses, an object of expression. An atom is
a symbol, like π, z, δ, or a numeral, like 3, 22/7, 3.14; although π expresses a
number (the half-circle perimeter), it is not a numeral. The formal lexicon
is not outside the natural lexicon; on the contrary, as we speak naturally of
π, the natural tends to encompass the formal.
An expression immediately does or does not match a pattern (not a set),
expressed by . For example, matches any expression, x matches any
expression, to be named x, Integer matches any integer numeral.
A formal system rewrites or evaluates any expression given by the user,
according to rules, possibly using patterns. Although an expression may
mean something for the user, meaning must not affect evaluation. A rule is
potential or delayed evaluation. For y in the formal lexicon, as there is no
better expression of y than y itself, y ⊲ x is expressed by a replacement rule,
x→ y, so that the formal system will evaluate x 7→ y. ⊲, ⊳, 7→ are not in the
formal lexicon, we use them to speak about the user and the formal system;
they are meta-symbols (like meta-characters in a typesetting system).
A program is an assembly of rules (obeying meta-rules). The user can
rule and interrupt evaluation. Without him, the formal system does nothing,
or runs in circles: homo ex machina prevents in girum imus nocte. This
also sounds like the principle of inertia in mechanics.
I take for a definition of recursivity and calculability [3, 3.1.2]. Calcu-
lability means evaluating into Integer or any other numerical pattern, like
Real. For example, π is calculable, but Ω defined in [4] is not.
An expression is – like a tree, with a trunk, branches and leaves, or a
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body, with a head, members and fingertips – a headed sequence of atoms or,
recursively, expressions, like x[y, z[1, 2]] or x+ y, standing for Plus[x, y]. The
depth of an expression is its recursion number, plus one, Depth[x[y, z[1, 2]]] 7→
3.
Definition 2.1. A formal system is universal if it can be ruled to evaluate
for any other formal system.
A Turing machine is a universal formal system. Many microprocessors
are Turing machines. The complexity of an expression, whatever the contro-
versial definition of complexity [1], depends on the formal system.
Definition 2.2. For a formal system f , let c[x, f ] ∈ R ∪ {∞} be the com-
plexity of x in f . c[x, f ] =∞ if x is non-calculable. For two formal systems
f, g, f is specialized in x, more than g, if c[x, f ] ≤ c[x, g].
Specialization is reusable complexity, packaged as a subroutine or a black
box, with public (non-private) rules, that are all what the user needs to know.
• A microprocessor is specialized in floating-point arithmetic by a so-
called floating-point unit.
• Computational fluid dynamics aims at specializing a formal system
in solving fluid-dynamics equations. The public rules are boundary
conditions and thermodynamic laws, like an equation of state.
• A set of wires, resistors, generators and gauges can contribute to a
formal system, specialized in solving linear algebraic equations with
real coefficients. The public rules are (Ohm and Kirchhoff) laws of
electrokinetics.
• A primitive idea of geometry is that a material system may be ruled to
partly evaluate itself, as the universe is ruled by the gnomon to evaluate
star positions [5].
Analog computing is when private rules are discovered, digital computing is
when private rules are invented. However, the difference between discovery
and invention (or analysis and synthesis, after Kant) is thin, because both
are interwoven. Anyway, the user is mostly concerned by computing power,
not the status of private rules.
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Noise seems to be a particular drawback of analog computing. However,
an analog system evaluating x with noise can be considered as evaluating the
probability density function of x without noise. In digital computing, apart
from purposely introduced Monte-Carlo noise and large thermodynamic fluc-
tuations, floating point arithmetic makes only round-up errors. But round-up
errors depend on random hardware, precision, units and programming: for
example, numerically (N), N [log[3/2]] 6= N [log[3]] − N [log[2]], so that log
can be considered as noisy. Finally, many techniques of numerical evaluation
are available, and no one is perfect.
2.2 Logic and algebra
The formal system should support not only replacement rules, but also rela-
tional rules ! (not Factorial), and evaluate accordingly, as in
x ∈ A! x ∈ A 7→ True .
Go˝del’s completude and incompletude theorems set limits on logical eval-
uation, independently of technique: a formal system supporting the rules of
logic but not arithmetic (N), or finite logic, can evaluate all its relational
expressions, while a formal system supporting the rules of both logic and
arithmetic, or infinite logic, cannot. Nevertheless, the user can always rule
what a formal system cannot evaluate, at his own risk of inconsistency or
redundancy.
Mathematica partly supports some semantic patterns, like x /; x ∈ R,
trying to match any expression of a real number, whatever its syntax. Se-
mantica [6], a Mathematica add-on, based on Solve, supports more semantic
patterns, like (2x )s, matching any expression with the double of its half.
Semantic pattern matching makes Mathematica look like it evaluates ac-
cording to its own understanding of sets. However, internally, a semantic
pattern reduces to syntactic patterns, covering limited instances of the in-
tended semantic pattern. The incompletude theorem implies that no formal
system can completely support semantic pattern matching [6]. The ultimate
responsibility for semantic pattern matching belongs to the user.
Although an object is identical only to itself [7, 5.5303], the user may
want to rule identities between expressions of one object, as in
π ⊲ 3, 3.14,
22
7
, (
∞∑
n=1
6
n2
)1/2 = 2ArcSin[1] =
∮
dθ
2
= π.
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x = y means x ⊲ y, y ⊲ x. The formal system should be able to evaluate
some identities, if not all. x = y legitimates both x → y, y → x, but,
in general, which one is more useful cannot be decided once for ever. A
solution, suggested by Burindan’s donkey, the wise animal, would be to keep
x, y under the constraint x = y.
Definition 2.3. f [#] conveys identity, if f [x] = f [y] whenever x = y.
x = y7→
f
7→
f [x] = f [y]
After y = f [x]!
y = f [x]
7→
Depth
7→
1 6= 2
Depth[#] does not convey identity.
Definition 2.4. A function f from a set A to a set B relates every element
x ∈ A to one element y ∈ B, or no one. Let F[A,B] be the set of functions
from A to B.
Actually, (def. 2.4) is so informal that a formal system can hardly support
it. What Mathematica readily supports is pure function, Function,
f [#]& = Function[x, f [x]], f [#]&[x] 7→ f [x], a function f ⊲ f [#]& ⊲ f.
Definition 2.5. For f ∈ F[A,B] ⊲ f [#]&, and x ∈ A, related to y ∈ B by
f , y = f [x]!
Theorem 2.1. f [#]& expresses a function iff (if and only if) f [#] conveys
identity.
Proof. Only if (⇒): a set, as opposed to a pattern, does not depend on syntax
(formalities); x, x∗, x = x∗, expressing the same element of A, are related to
y = f [x] = f [x˜]. If (⇐): construct the quotient of f modulo identity.
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As #[[1]]& = Part[#, 1]& [2] expresses a projection, #[[1]] conveys iden-
tity. Conversely, as Depth[#] does not convey identity, Depth (syntax-
sensitive) expresses no function.
Definition 2.6. f depends on x or x is implicit in f , ∂xf 6= 0, if f matches
g [x]s.
No formal system can completely support g [x]s. Mathematica does not
support semantic functional patterns, neither Semantica, because Solve does
not support functional equations. For f depending on x, f = g[x], f [x] is
not a value of the function f , but a value of a function h, h[x] = g[x][x].
Definition 2.7. x is completely explicit in f [x] if f does not depend on x.
Formalization (to express the elements without the sets), carried out to
algebra, yields formal algebra. In particular, some basic (relational) rules of
pure function algebra are
(f + g )[x ] = f [x ] + g [x ]! (2.1)
(f g )[x ] = f [x ]g [x ]! (2.2)
x ◦ y = Circle[x , y ]! f ◦ g [x ] = f [g [x ]]! (2.3)
As for a vector space, in order to reuse existing rules, while discerning
field elements, I propose to express, on one hand, both internal and external
multiplicative laws by Times, orderless,
x y = Times[x , y ]! x y = y x !
on the other hand, a field element by x ∈ K!
−1 ∈ K! x − y = x + (−1)y !
Formal function algebra is specialized in formal function K-algebra by
f [ ]/; f ∈ K → f.
Definition 2.8. A function f is a K-linear , f ∈ LFs[K], if
f [x + y ] = f [x ] + f [y ], f [λ x ] = λ f [x ]/;λ ∈ K.
For f ∈ LFs[K], f [x − y ] = f [x ]− f [y ].
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2.3 Perturbation
Definition 2.9. The perturbation and error symbols are Star, δ. For x, x∗
expressing elements of an additive group, x ⊲ x∗, with the error
δ[x] = x∗ − x.
For x, x∗ expressing elements of a real vector space, and a perturbation am-
plitude ǫ ∈ [0, 1], x ⊲ x∗ǫ , with the error
δǫ[x] = x
∗
ǫ − x.
x∗ = Star[x], x∗ǫ = Star[ǫ, x],
δǫ[x] = δ[ǫ, x],
x∗0 → x, x
∗
1 → x
∗,
f [x]∗ = f ∗[x∗], f [x]∗ǫ = f
∗
ǫ [x
∗
ǫ ].
• x is constant (non-variable), x ∈ Cst, if δ[x] = δ [x] = 0.
• x is unshielded (non-shielded), x ∈ Uns, if δǫ [x] = ǫ δ[x].
δǫ[x] = ǫδ[x] for ǫ ∈ {0, 1} and even for ǫ ∈ [0, 1], if x ∈ Uns.
From (def. 2.9), we infer
δ0[ ]→ 0, δ1 → δ,
x ∗/; x ∈ Cst→ x, x ∗ǫ/; x ∈ Cst→ x.
As Cst,Uns express no sets outside the formal system, I call them pseudo-
sets. If x ∈ Cst, then x ∈ Uns. The formal system should at least partly
support the pseudo-inclusion Cst ⊂ Uns, as in
x ∈ Cst! x ∈ Uns 7→ True .
The interest of x⊲x∗ without x∗ → x is when x∗ matches a simple pattern,
that x does not match. Typically, x ∈ R and x∗ is a floating-point numeral,
matching Real.
δ[#] is not meant to convey identity. For example, let x, y be the lengths
of both branches of the upright-faced letter V; although ideally x = y, there
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Table 1: compound error (chain rule)
(f + δǫ[f ])[y + δǫ[y]]=
δǫ[f [x]] = f [x]
∗
ǫ − f [x]
▽ ▽ ▽
∆ǫ[f ] = f
⋆
ǫ − f
are drawing errors δ[x], δ[y], that need not be identical to zero nor to each
other.
x = y7→
δ
7→
δ[x] 6= δ[y]
A physicist would say (privately, so that only another physicist can under-
stand): perturbation breaks the Curie principle. From (the. 2.1), δ expresses
no function. If you reject the pure function δ, then you must consider δx as
an atom, and you cannot speak of error, abstractly or symbolically.
Perturbation and error expressions are naturally and informally abbrevi-
ated using total perturbation and total error (like “total derivation”) ∆, ⋆
(tab. 1).
Theorem 2.2.
∆ǫ[f ] ⊳ δǫ[f [x]] = f [x
∗
ǫ ]− f [x] + δǫ[f ][x
∗
ǫ ].
Proof. Use (2.3).
Like motion, perturbation is relative to a steady frame, made of constant
symbols:
Plus ∈ Cst! Times ∈ Cst! − 1 ∈ Cst! Power ∈ Cst! Circle ∈ Cst! (2.4)
Theorem 2.3. For f ∈ Cst, Star, f commute,
f [x]∗ǫ = f [x
∗
ǫ ], δǫ[f [x]] = f [x
∗
ǫ ]− f [x].
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If moreover f ∈ LFs[K], then δ, f commute,
δǫ[f [x]] = f [δǫ[x]].
Theorem 2.4 (product error).
δǫ[yx] = yδǫ[x] + x
∗
ǫδǫ[y].
If moreover x, y ∈ Uns, then
δǫ[yx] = ǫ(yδ[x] + xδ[y]) + ǫ
2δ[x]δ[y].
Proof. Use (the. 2.3), with f → Times; Times ∈ Cst (2.4) and Times is
orderless.
Theorem 2.5. For x, y ∈ Cst, x + y, xy, x−1 ∈ Cst, Cst is an algebra.
Moreover, xy, x[y], x ◦ y ∈ Cst. Star ∈ LFs[Cst], δ ∈ LFs[Cst]. Cst is
the kernel of δ. Uns is a Cst-vector space. If f ∈ Uns and x ∈ Cst, then
f [x] ∈ Uns. Uns is stable for f ∈ Cst, f ∈ LFs[K].
Proof. Firstly, use (2.4). Lastly, use (the. 2.3),
∀x ∈ Uns, δǫ[f [x]] = f [δǫ[x]] = f [ǫδ[x]] = ǫf [δ[x]] = ǫδ[f [x]], f [x] ∈ Uns .
Attention: from (the. 2.4), the product of unshielded expressions is in
general shielded, Uns is not an algebra.
3 Experiment
3.1 Observability
Definition 3.1. The world is a real vector space T . A state is T ∈ T . For
p ∈ N,
Tp → If[p = 0, T ,F[R
p, T ]].
A material system is T ∈ Tp. If p 6= 0, then an input of T is z ∈ R
p, ∃T [z] ∈
T . The input number of T is p.
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Definition 3.2. For a material system T , an expression x is abstract (non-
concrete), x ∈ Abs, if it does not depend (def. 2.6) on T .
The complexity of concrete expressions decreases with concrete special-
ization (def. 2.2).
Definition 3.3. For n, p ∈ N, M ∈ F[Tp,R
n], T ∈ Tp, the material property
M [T ] is observable, as the output of the experiment {M,T}, and n is the
output number of the experiment, if M [T ] is calculable. For p = 0, M is a
state function and the experiment is static.
The experiment aims at partly evaluating T , which is not required to be
observable a priori. Let M be a state function: for T ∈ T , {M,T} is a static
experiment; for p 6= 0, T ∈ Tp, {M ◦#&, T} is an experiment, and its output
is the function M ◦ T .
Definition 3.4. For n, p ∈ N, M ∈ F[Tp,R
n], T ∈ Tp, Γ is a gauge of
M [T ], sensitive to the flux Φ[T ], if M [T ] = Γ[Φ[T ]] and Γ is calculable.
Γ aims at making Γ[Φ[T ]] less complex that Φ[T ], which is not required
to be observable a priori. Γ,Φ express laws of physics (or any experimental
science).
Theorem 3.1. For M [T ] ∈ Rn, M [T ] observable, and P ∈ F[Rn,R], P
calculable, P [M [T ]] is observable, as the the output of the experiment {P ◦
M,T}.
Proof. The compound of calculable functions is calculable.
For example, n→ 1, f → log, if M [T ] > 0, then log[M [T ]] is observable.
Definition 3.5. For an experiment {T,M}, and a calculable function P
of M [T ], P interprets M [T ] to M˜ [T ] = P [M [T ]]. The interpretation P is
tautologic if P = Identity, private if M˜ /∈ Abs.
#[[1]]& interprets {M1[T ],M2[T ]} to M1[T ], yielding a new experiment
{M1, T}.
Theorem 3.2. For two experiments {M,T} and {M˜, T}, and a calculable
function P of M [T ], P interprets M [T ] to M˜ [T ] iff P is a gauge of M˜ [T ],
sensitive to M [T ]. Moreover, for M ∈ Abs, the interpretation P from M [T ]
is private (def. 3.5) iff the gauge P of M˜ [T ] is concrete (def. 3.2).
Proof. Use (def. 3.4, def. 3.5, the. 3.1) and M˜ [T ] = P [M [T ]].
A private interpretation should be presented as a concrete gauge.
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3.2 Controllability
Definition 3.6. Let S ∈ F[F[R,R],R], S calculable. The set of material sys-
tems T , controllable by the servo-function S, according to the state function
R ∈ F[T ,R], is
C[R, S] = {T ∈ T1, ∃!ρ[T ] ∈ R, R[T [ρ[T ]]] = 0,
R ◦ T observable, ρ[T ] = S[R ◦ T ]}. (3.1)
For T ∈ C[R, S], the eigeninput of T is ρ[T ].
For T ∈ T1, S interprets R ◦ T to ρ[T ]. For example, let S[f ] be the root
of f ∈ F[R,R], f existing everywhere, continuous, strictly monotonous and
crossing 0. S[f ] is calculable by dichotomy. For T ∈ T1, T ∈ C[R, S] if R ◦ T
is like f before.
Definition 3.7. The constraint pure function is C, x = C[x ],
(M [T ][#]&)s/; (T ∈ C[R, S],M [T ] /∈ C[R, S])→M [T ][ρ[T ]].
Theorem 3.3. For P ∈ Abs (def. 3.2), C, P commute.
Proof.
P [M [T ][#]&] = P [M [T ][ρ[T ]]] = P [M [T ][#]&].
For M [T ] matching semantically a function, like the derivative M [T ] = T ′,
shortly,
P [M [T ]] = P [M [T ][ρ[T ]]] = P [M [T ]].
3.3 Perturbation under constraint
Theorem 3.4. If ρ ∈ Cst and Star ∈ Abs, ǫ ∈ Abs, then C, Star commute
on M [T ]: perturbation under constraint is the same as constraint under per-
turbation.
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Proof. Thanks to ρ ∈ Cst (in the lower horizontal branch) and Star ∈
Abs, ǫ ∈ Abs (in the right vertical branch),
M [T ]
Star[ǫ,#]&
7→ M∗ǫ [T
∗
ǫ ]
C
7→
C
7→
M [T ][ρ[T ]]
Star[ǫ,#]&
7→ M∗ǫ [T
∗
ǫ ][ρ[T
∗
ǫ ]]
Moreover, C ∈ Cst iff ρ ∈ Cst if S ∈ Cst, R ∈ Cst (def. 3.6). To satisfy
the hypothesis of (the. 3.4),
Star ∈ Abs! δ ∈ Abs, ǫ ∈ Abs! (3.2)
S ∈ Cst! R ∈ Cst! ρ, C ∈ Cst . (3.3)
Theorem 3.4 is implicitly used in thermodynamics, as a principle, assert-
ing that, in a state to state transformation, like a monothermal compression,
the final value of a state function, like energy, does not depend on the order of
perturbation (compression) and constraint (constant temperature). C ∈ Cst
means that compression does not affect the reservoir temperature.
If Plus ∈ Abs, R ∈ Abs, then, considering that Plus, R ◦ T semantically
match functions,
M1[T ] +M2[T ] = M1[T ] +M2[T ], R ◦ T = R[T ]
and, with perturbation,
(R ◦ T )∗ǫ = (R ◦ T )
∗
ǫ = R ◦ T
∗
ǫ = R ◦ T
∗
ǫ [ρ[T
∗
ǫ ]] = R[T
∗
ǫ ] ⊲ R
⋆
ǫ .
Let T, T ∗ǫ ∈ C[R, S], δ[T ] /∈ C[R, S]. By (def. 3.7),
T ∗ = T + δ[T ]
7→
C
7→
T ∗[ρ[T ∗]] 6= (T + δ[T ])[ρ[T ]] = T ∗[ρ[T ]]
# does not convey identity, C expresses no function (the. 2.1). Equivalently,
T ∗ − T matches the semantic pattern of (def. 3.7) in two ways, T → T or
T → T ∗ (a donkey problem again).
12
Table 2: constraint and perturbation shorthands
x x = x⊲
ρ[T ] ρ
T T [ρ] T
T ′ T ′[ρ] T ′
ρ[T ∗ǫ ] ρ
⋆
ǫ
T ∗ǫ T
∗
ǫ [ρ
⋆
ǫ ] T
∗
ǫ
R ◦ T ∗ǫ R[T
∗
ǫ ] R
⋆
ǫ
δ[T ] δ[T ][ρ] δ[T ]
4 Design
4.1 Complexity reduction
Let T ∈ T . The user-experimentalist wants to observe (to make observable)
not the whole of T , but some less complex material property σ[T ] ∈ R. He
finds out an input in T , on which σ[T ] depends,
∃Function[ǫ ∈ [0, 1], T ∗ǫ ∈ T ] ⊲ T
∗
#& ∈ T1, T = T
∗
0 , ∂ǫσ[T
∗
ǫ ] 6= 0,
and a state function R ∈ F[T ,R], such that R[T ∗ǫ ] is observable for ǫ ∈
[0, 1], hence the synthetic experiment {(R ◦ #)&, T ∗#&}. The problem is,
to find an interpretation P from R ◦ T ∗ to σ[T ], yielding the experiment
{σ[#[0]]&, T ∗#&}, of output σ[T
∗
0 ] = σ[T ] = P [R ◦ T
∗]. The pure function
#[0]& expresses the Dirac measure, thus linked to analytic experiment.
I assume a linear gauge σ[T ]#& of R[T ], sensitive to Φ[T ], and
σ ∈ LFs[R], σ ∈ Cst, δ[σ[T ]] = −σ[T ], T ∈ Uns .
∀ǫ ∈ [0, 1], σ[T ∗ǫ ] = σ[T ] + ǫσ[δ[T ]] = σ[T ](1− ǫ),
R[T ∗ǫ ] = σ[T ]Φ[T
∗
ǫ ](1− ǫ),
(R ◦ T ∗)′[0] = ∂ǫR[T
∗
ǫ ]/.ǫ→ 0
= σ[T ](dΦ[T ][δ[T ]]− Φ[T ]).
If dΦ[T ][δ[T ]] = 0 and Φ[T ] is observable, then −Φ[T ]−1#& interprets (R ◦
T ∗)′[0] to σ[T ], as expected.
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In the case [8], σ[T ] cannot be so easily evaluated; σ[T ] is a component
of T :
T = {σ[T ], T˜}, T˜ ∈ Cst!
δ[T ] = {−σ[T ], 0}, T ∗ǫ = {σ[T ](1− ǫ), T˜}.
∀ǫ ∈ [0, 1], R[T ∗ǫ ] =
∞∑
t=0
rt[σ[T ], T˜ ]ǫ
t.
Instead of σ[T ], rt[σ[T ], T˜ ], t = 0, 1 . . . are observable (after another inter-
pretation, that is interpolation). The user has not only an inverse problem,
but also the problem that rt[#, T˜ ]& is a private interpretation from σ[T ].
The signal to noise ratio is r1[σ[T ], T˜ ]/r0[σ[T ], T˜ ]; the shielding ratio is
r2[σ[T ], T˜ ]/r1[σ[T ], T˜ ] (null if Φ ∈ Uns, from (4.1)). The user wants to min-
imize the latter and to maximize the former, while avoiding large variations
of R (for private reasons). Therefore, he relaxes T˜ ∈ Cst and finds an input
in T˜ , on which R[T ] depends,
∃T˜ ∗#&, T˜ = T˜
∗
0 , ∂ǫR[{σ[T ], T˜
∗
ǫ }] 6= 0,
T2[x, y] = {σ[T ](1− x), T˜
∗[y]}, ∂x,yT2[x, y] = 0,
R˜[x ] = R[x ]−R[T ],
such that R[T2[x, y]] is observable for x, y ∈ [0, 1], hence the experiment
{R˜ ◦ #&, T2}. For T2[x,#]& ∈ C[R˜, S] (def. 3.7), R˜ ◦ T2 is interpreted by
S[Function[y,#[x, y]]]& to ρ[T2[x,#]&]:
ρ[T2[x,#]&] = S[R˜ ◦ T2[x,#]&] = S[Function[y, R˜ ◦ T2[x, y]]].
Synthetically, R˜◦T2 is interpreted by Function[x, S[Function[y,#[x, y]]]&] to
Function[x, ρ[T2[x,#]&]].
∀ǫ ∈ [0, 1], ρ[T2[ǫ,#]&] =
∞∑
t=0
r˜t[σ[T ], T˜
∗
#&]ǫ
t.
Instead of σ[T ], r˜t[σ[T ], T˜
∗
#&], t = 0, 1 . . . are observable, without large vari-
ations of R, but with a worse privacy problem, since the private variable is
now functional.
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Complexity constraints leads to observe another material property than
initially contemplated; ignoring this fact is a frequent cause of misunder-
standing.
Experiment design follows from calculability. According to (def. 3.3) and
[3, 3.1.2], σ[T ] is observable if the formal system can evaluate step0[T ],
stept [T ]/; testt[σ˜t[T ]]→ t, stept [T ]→ stept+1[T ],
σ˜t [T ]→ Pt[σ, T ][σ˜t−1[T ]], testt [T ]→ Pt[test, T ][testt−1[T ]].
This experimental program is such that t is incremented only after the test
has failed, so that step0[T ] returns the minimum t passing the test (also a
fixed point of the pure function step). For t ∈ Nr {0}, Pt[σ, T ] is a gauge of
σ˜t[T ], sensitive to σ˜t−1[T ], or an interpretation from σ˜t−1[T ] to σ˜t[T ], public
if ∂TPt[σ, T ] = 0.
The user is responsible for the initial idea σ˜0[T ], for ruling P and for
interrupting. He plays a game against nature (as in [9]) and P expresses
his strategy. For example, if σ[T ] is the average of a random variable, then
Pt[σ,#] means simply “try again”,
Pt[σ, T ][σ˜t−1[T ]]→ Random[T ],
while Pt[test,#] should be some convergence criterion.
∂tPt 6= 0 allows dynamic programming, or debugging: to have step0[T ]
evaluated step by step and to decide Pt as late as possible, taking into account
past experiments, that is experience.
4.2 Error reduction
If σ[T ] was already known (numerically), then the user could test accuracy
by
testt[x ]→ (|x− σ[T ]| ≤ e Real).
Actually, σ[T ] is not usually known. test may ensure termination, but not
accuracy: this all the ambiguity of “finishing a job”. When experimenting
has stopped at t, the error is, symbolically,
σ˜t[T ]− σ[T ] = σ
∗[T ∗]− σ[T ] = σ[T ∗]− σ[T ] + δ[σ][T ∗].
The realization error is σ[T ∗] − σ[T ]; the programming error is δ[σ][T ] ≈
δ[σ][T ∗]. Good realization is ruined by bad programming, and conversely;
both errors ought to be simultaneously small.
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Table 3: the lexicon of dependence and independence
non-universal universal
specialized unspecialized
implicit explicit
concrete abstract
private public
variable constant
shielded unshielded
Table 4: the lexicon of experiment
constraint controllable eigeninput error
experiment exp. program gauge flux
input interpretation
mat. property mat. system observable output
perturbation servo-function state state function
5 Conclusion
5.1 Rhetoric of experiment
The understanding of dependence, or semantic pattern matching, is essential
in experiment, while no formal system can completely support it. Now that
we have got a rather precise language for dependence (tab. 3) and experiment
(tab. 4), let us play with it, for public, non-technical, expert-free discussion.
Dependence is not only relation but action, or calculability. Relation
without action easily leads to non-sense.
• An electrical engineer needs to evaluate a current i, from the heat ri2
released by a resistor. The initial experiment is {r#2, i}. Assuming
that r is observable (which is another problem), ri2 is interpreted by
(r−1#)1/2& to |i|. The sign of the current cannot be determined (unless
some other kind of gauge is used). But ri2 also matches (k i)s, with
k → ri, and ri2 is interpreted by k−1#& to i. This interpretation fails,
because k is not observable.
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• More generally, any observable M [T ] cannot be interpreted to σ[T ] by
P, P [M [T ]] = σ[T ], unless P is calculable.
Implicit inputs can play tricks on the user-experimentalist.
• A heating engineer needs to evaluate a temperature θ in a furnace. He
uses as a gauge a thermocouple, the output of which is interpreted by
an amplifier P . Unfortunately, the amplifier is directly heated by the
furnace, so that its gain depends on θ. P is a private interpretation from
the thermocouple output or the gauge of some material property, hardly
related to temperature. This can be corrected, by either insulating the
amplifier or expliciting temperature in gain.
• Two surveyors, one working near the North pole, the other near the
equator, need to evaluate the sum of angles of triangular oceanic plots.
They may disagree, until they understand that the laws of geometry,
expressed by Φ, depend on curvature, decreasing with latitude. This
is a typical problem of hidden variable, or restrictive semantic pattern
matching.
• Hidden variables have been similarly suspected in quantum mechanics,
in particular by Einstein.
To name a gauge after the material property it was intended to evaluate,
instead of the material property it actually evaluates, is to take our desires
for realities. Without interpretation, we can hope to observe nothing but
natural numbers, as in sheep counting, and, hopefully, real numbers, as read
on rules.
• An accelerometer does not evaluate acceleration, but displacement, to
be interpreted to acceleration by second derivation.
• A flow meter does not evaluate flow rate, but some concrete material
property, like a turbine angular velocity, hence “calibration” problems.
• A hygrometer does not evaluate humidity, but the length of a hair. Of
course, hair-length meters would not sell as well as hygrometers.
• A lie detector. . .
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Table 5: formal systems?
T Φ[T ] R[Φ[T ]]
universal rules, data trace output
quantum potential, mass wave function probability
transport source, cross section particle flux average number
mechanical initial condition, mass motion position
human intention, knowledge thought speech
economic needs, goods market price
5.2 Universality, not reductionism
Many formal systems seem to occur naturally (tab. 5) and to behave simi-
larly. However, their universal reduction (def. 2.1) is far from being effective,
because of thick complexity barriers. Universality does not mean reduction-
ism.
Thanks
Thanks to Re´mi Barre`re, for many fruitful discussions, about mathematics,
computer science and philosophy.
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